FACTORS INFLUENCING THE APPOINTMENT OF ADVISORS TO THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.25264/2786-9202/4.1-35-54Keywords:
advisor, presidential appointments, loyalty, competenceAbstract
The article examines the factors that influence the appointment of staff and non-staff advisors to the presidents of Ukraine during the terms of Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Yushchenko, Viktor Yanukovych, Petro Poroshenko, and Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Although advisors are not public figures, they belong to the president’s inner circle, have access to sensitive information, and take part in shaping domestic and foreign policy decisions. The analysis employs binary logistic regression, in which the advisor’s status, staff or non-staff, serves as the dependent variable. The aggregated variables of competence and loyalty are found not to be statistically significant predictors of advisor status. Instead, four significant factors are identified: length of tenure, previous experience in public office, membership in the president’s party, and electoral experience. As tenure lengthens, the probability of staff status decreases. Prior public-sector experience and party membership increase this probability, whereas electoral experience reduces it, since such individuals are less likely to join the president’s staff apparatus. The highest probability of a staff appointment is observed among individuals who combine party membership with public-service experience, which supports distinguishing a separate category: specialists with political ties. The study reveals the logic of forming the presidential entourage, in which control over the apparatus and the minimization of internal competition take priority over independent expertise.
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Dahlström, C., Lapuente, V., & Teorell, J. (2012). The merit of meritocratization: Politics, bu-reaucracy, and the institutional deterrents of corruption. Political Research Quarterly, 65(3), 656–668. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912911408109
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