THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT’S INFORMATION STRATEGY IN THE PRE-WAR PERIOD (DECEMBER 2021 – FEBRUARY 2022)

Abstract

The article examines the effectiveness of the Ukrainian government’s information strategy during the period from December 2021 to February 2022, in the context of the growing threat of a full-scale Russian invasion. The core problem lies in the fact that official communication in a crisis must simultaneously perform two contradictory functions: maintaining social stability while also increasing threat awareness and societal readiness for mobilization. The study asks whether the government’s information strategy contributed to heightened perceptions of the threat and greater public readiness to resist.
The empirical base combines two data sets. First, a quantitative content analysis of public statements by officials during the specified period was conducted, with messages coded into categories (denial of the threat, implicit reference to the threat, acknowledgement of the threat, and reassuring rhetoric) and with an assessment of the level of anxiety conveyed in the rhetoric. Second, a statistical analysis was carried out using data from sociological surveys conducted by leading polling organisations (notably the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Razumkov Centre) on the likelihood of invasion, perceptions of the threat, and readiness for armed defence of the country. The comparative logic of the study consists of juxtaposing the dynamics of official rhetoric, its coherence across institutions, and changes in public attitudes. The results point to a specific model of «calm readiness,» characterised by rhetorical volatility between institutions and the absence of a single communication centre. The content analysis records a sharp increase in anxiety levels in January 2022, followed by deliberate “smoothing” in February, reflecting an attempt to balance informing the public with preventing panic. At the same time, growing coherence of messages over the three-month period can be observed; however, the relationship between changes in rhetoric and public attitudes is not direct. The strategy partially ensured stability and a gradual increase in readiness to resist without triggering mass panic, but asynchrony between official signals and citizens’ reactions, as well as a rising share of undecided respondents, indicates the limited effectiveness of direct governmental messaging in shaping public opinion. The conclusions emphasise that, under conditions of multiple information sources, the key factors are not control over channels but coordination and consistency in government communication. The practical significance of the findings lies in formulating recommendations for state crisis communication under conditions of existential threat.